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On October 27, 2014, CDC released guidance for monitor-
ing and movement of persons with potential Ebola virus disease 
(Ebola) exposure in the United States (1). For persons with 
possible exposure to Ebola, this guidance recommended risk 
categorization, daily monitoring during the 21-day incubation 
period, and, for persons in selected risk categories, movement 
restrictions. The purpose of the guidance was to delineate 
methods for early identification of symptoms among persons 
at potential risk for Ebola so that they could be isolated, tested, 
and if necessary, treated to improve their chance of survival 
and reduce transmission. Within 7 days, all 50 states and two 
local jurisdictions (New York City [NYC] and the District of 
Columbia [DC]) had implemented the guidelines. During 
November 3, 2014–March 8, 2015, a total of 10,344 per-
sons were monitored for up to 21 days with >99% complete 
monitoring. This public health response demonstrated the 
ability of state, territorial, and local health agencies to rapidly 
implement systems to effectively monitor thousands of persons 
over a sustained period.
Enhanced entry screening was conducted at five U.S. 
international airports at which travelers from Ebola-affected 
West African countries were identified and assigned a risk 
categorization for Ebola exposure. The Ebola-affected West 
African countries and the U.S. risk categories have changed 
over time, as described in the CDC interim U.S. guidance 
(1). Enhanced entry screening identified symptomatic travel-
ers needing further evaluation. Federal authorities screened, 
educated, and collected information on travelers. Traveler 
information was provided to state, territorial, and local public 
health authorities to conduct health monitoring (2). Health 
care workers (HCWs) who cared for Ebola patients domesti-
cally, including laboratory staff, were identified through their 
health care facilities. Guidance for monitoring and movement 
of persons with potential Ebola exposure recommended risk 
stratification and public health actions for each category (1). 
Four risk categories were created: high, some, low but not zero 
(in this report referred to as low), and no identifiable risk.*
After potential exposure to Ebola, one of two daily public 
health actions, either active monitoring (AM) or direct active 
monitoring (DAM), was required for 21 days. AM was rec-
ommended for low-risk travelers and consisted of twice-daily 
temperature checks and self-evaluation for symptoms consis-
tent with Ebola (1,3). Persons under AM reported their health 
status to the public health authority overseeing monitoring at 
least once daily (1,4). DAM was recommended for persons at 
high risk or some risk, as well as for HCWs at low risk who 
* Additional information available at http://www.cdc.gov/vhf/ebola/exposure/
risk-factors-when-evaluating-person-for-exposure.html.  
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had cared for Ebola patients in the United States. In addition 
to AM requirements, DAM included twice-daily reports to 
the monitoring jurisdiction with at least once-daily direct 
visualization of the individual by the health authority (1,4).
Complete monitoring (either AM or DAM) was defined 
as making contact with the monitored person with no gaps 
in reporting (e.g., no loss to follow-up) of >48 hours. Weekly 
estimates of the number of persons under monitoring and 
reporting symptoms, and calculations of incomplete monitor-
ing were collected from the jurisdictions’ weekly reports. The 
overall estimate of persons under monitoring was calculated 
as the sum of persons reported as 1) completing monitoring, 
2) leaving the United States during their monitoring period, 
and 3) remaining under monitoring on March 8, 2015.
Monitoring was conducted by 60 jurisdictions: the 50 states, 
NYC and DC, five U.S. territories (American Samoa, 
Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands, Guam, 
Puerto Rico, and U.S. Virgin Islands), and three freely-asso-
ciated states (Federated States of Micronesia, Republic of the 
Marshall Islands, and Republic of Palau) (4). Until March 9, 
jurisdictions submitted individual-level, daily reports to CDC 
for all persons under monitoring who were at high risk or 
some risk. These reports included data on monitoring (e.g., 
compliance and reported symptoms), transportation plans 
should the person become symptomatic, assigned assessment 
hospitals, and intrastate and interstate travel plans of persons 
under monitoring. All jurisdictions submitted aggregate weekly 
reports for persons at low risk (including reports when no 
one was monitored) and reported the same monitoring data 
as in the daily reports. Information on returning Department 
of Defense personnel restricted to a military station for their 
21-day monitoring period was not reported to CDC and is 
reported elsewhere (5).
During November 3, 2014–March 8, 2015, in the 60 juris-
dictions, 10,344 persons were monitored (Table). Overall, 
91.9% of the persons monitored were travelers at low risk, 
5.1% were HCWs at low risk who had provided patient care 
in the United States, and 3.0% were persons at high or some 
risk (Figure 1).
During the study period, a median of 1,710 persons 
(range = 1,331–2,119) were monitored in a given reporting 
week (Figure 2). Among HCWs at low risk caring for patients 
in the United States, 96% were monitored during November 
and early December, after giving care to the first patients 
treated for Ebola in the United States. In mid-December and 
early February, the number of persons at high risk or some risk 
increased 240% and 307%, respectively, corresponding with 
the return of two teams of U.S. Public Health Service officers 
who had staffed an Ebola treatment unit in Monrovia, Liberia.
In a given week, a median of 1.5 persons for whom monitor-
ing was indicated could not be contacted upon arrival in the 
jurisdiction (0.4%; range = 0–48 persons per week). The number 
of persons who could not be contacted in a given week decreased 
from a median of 23 persons per week (1.4%) in November 
to less than one person per week in February (0.03%). Of the 
persons ever contacted for monitoring, a median of 7.5 persons 
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had gaps in being monitored that were >48 hours in a given week 
(0.6%; range = 1–26 persons per week). The median number 
of persons with >48-hour gaps in monitoring decreased from 
20 persons per week (1.0%) in November to three per week 
(0.2%) in February.
During a given reporting week, a median of 20 persons under 
monitoring (1.2%, range  =  9–43 persons) reported Ebola-
compatible symptoms. The number of symptomatic persons 
peaked in December 2014. Of the symptomatic persons in 
the low-risk and some-risk categories, 39 were tested for Ebola 
during their monitoring period; none tested positive for Ebola. 
No persons at high risk reported Ebola-compatible symptoms.
All 50 states, DC, NYC, Puerto Rico, and the U.S. Virgin 
Islands monitored persons at low risk (Figure 3). Forty-four 
states, DC, NYC, and Puerto Rico monitored one or more 
persons at high risk or some risk. Three territories and three 
freely-associated states had no persons under monitoring. More 
than half (54%) of the persons were monitored 
in five jurisdictions. The most persons were 
monitored in NYC, followed by Maryland, 
Pennsylvania, Georgia, and Virginia (Figure 3). 
NYC monitored nearly twice as many persons 
as Maryland.
Discussion
Within 7 days of issuance of CDC guidance 
on movement and monitoring in October 
2014, all 50 states and two local jurisdictions 
were effectively monitoring travelers arriving 
from countries with widespread Ebola transmis-
sion and HCWs caring for patients with Ebola 
in the United States. By December 22, all U.S. 
territories were reporting to CDC. Less than 
1% of monitoring was incomplete. Anecdotally 
reported reasons for incomplete monitoring 
included missing or incorrect contact informa-
tion, logistical issues (e.g., transfer from one 
jurisdiction to another), and noncompliance 
by persons being monitored.
TABLE. Summary of active and direct active monitoring of persons with potential Ebola exposure, by risk category — United States, November 3, 2014–
March 8, 2015  
Monitoring element
Risk category
TotalHigh risk and some risk
Low (but not zero) risk
Travelers U.S. HCWs
Type of daily monitoring DAM AM DAM —
Reporting frequency to CDC Daily Weekly Weekly —
No. of persons monitored 315 9,512 527 10,344*
No. of jurisdictions conducting monitoring 47 54 10 54
Abbreviations: AM = active monitoring; DAM = direct active monitoring; HCWs: Health care workers, including laboratory personnel.
* Adjusted for persons whose risk category changed from some risk to low risk.
FIGURE 1. Number of persons (N = 10,344) with potential Ebola 
exposure who were monitored, by risk category and week — United 
States, November 3, 2014–March 8, 2015
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FIGURE 2. Number of persons (N = 10,344) with potential Ebola exposure who were 
monitored and percentage with complete monitoring, by week — United States, 
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* Complete monitoring is defined as making contact with the monitored person with no gaps in reporting 
of >48 hours.
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These efforts demonstrate the capacity and infrastructure 
developed by U.S. jurisdictions to urgently respond to a large-
scale monitoring need. Since 2002, considerable resources have 
been distributed to public health departments to effectively 
respond to infectious disease outbreaks and other public health 
threats (6). Additional resources also have been awarded to 
jurisdictions for Ebola-related activities.
The findings in this report are subject to at least two limita-
tions. First, because weekly data were reported in aggregate, the 
estimated numbers of persons monitored might be inexact. For 
example, overestimates would result if a jurisdiction reported 
the same person in both low-risk and some-risk categories 
for a given reporting period. This likely would occur when a 
person’s risk classification changed during the 21-day monitor-
ing period (e.g., an HCW who completed work in an Ebola 
treatment unit days before departing the country could change 
from some risk to low risk). Duplicates were corrected when-
ever identified. Second, the calculation of the overall number 
of persons under monitoring might be an underestimate if all 
persons were not reported as having completed their monitor-
ing, leaving the United States, or still being under monitoring 
on March 8, 2015.
These results provide evidence of successful U.S. monitoring 
for Ebola. Jurisdictions demonstrated public health capacity to 
rapidly conduct and effectively monitor thousands of persons 
over a sustained period. After monitoring of 10,344 persons, 
no transmission of Ebola was reported during the study period, 
and few persons under monitoring reported symptoms sug-
gesting potential Ebola infection (7). Given the complexity 
and amount of coordination of effort required, the Ebola 
monitoring program in the United States provided systemic 
evidence of the capability of state, territorial, and local health 
departments to ensure and protect the health of the U.S. public.
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FIGURE 3. Number of persons with potential Ebola exposure 
monitored in 50 states, New York City, and the District of Columbia 
— November 3, 2014–March 8, 2015 
Summary
What is already known on this topic?
The 2014–2015 Ebola virus disease (Ebola) epidemic is the largest 
ever reported. During March 25, 2014– June 23, 2015, a total of 
15,109 laboratory-confirmed cases of Ebola were reported and 
11,232 persons died, primarily in Guinea, Liberia, and Sierra 
Leone. To prevent transmission of Ebola in the United States, CDC 
issued monitoring and movement guidance on October 27, 2014, 
and provided epidemiologic and clinical expertise in support of 
60 jurisdictions’ implementation of this guidance.
What is added by this report?
This report is the first to present results from the 60 U.S. 
jurisdictions that monitored persons with potential exposure to 
Ebola, including those returning from Ebola-affected countries. 
A total of 10,344 persons were monitored during November 3, 
2014–March 8, 2015, with >99% complete monitoring.
What are the implications for public health practice?
This report provides evidence that jurisdictions can rapidly 
implement a complex monitoring system and monitor thou-
sands of persons with potential exposure to Ebola over a 
sustained period. In addition, this report provides documenta-
tion that among the 10,344 monitored, none were diagnosed 
with Ebola.
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